In our readings this semester, I have been interested in what each of our authors has said about epistemologies and how rhetors go about creating/finding/using knowledge in their speeches/writings. Quintilian’s discussion of imitation in this week’s readings raised a question for me as to whether or not we can consider imitation as epistemic. In answering this question, I found myself saying yes and no.
On the yes side of the equation, I saw Quintilian as making a connection between imitation and Aristotle’s topics. While he does not outright mention Aristotle’s topics, Quintilian’s discussion of how imitation prepares someone is very similar to Aristotle’s description of how the topics prepare someone. Specifically, Quintilian describes how young boys can profit from accustoming themselves to the best compositions as “they will always have in their memories something which they may imitate, and will, even without being aware, reproduce that fashion of style which they have deeply impressed upon their minds (114). He continues, “they will have at command, moreover, an abundance of the best words, phrases, and figures, not sought for the occasion, but offering themselves spontaneously, as it were, from a store treasured within them.” So, from this, it appears that Quintilian believes that through imitation, a young rhetor will be able to build up a store, or in Aristotelian terms a collection of commonplaces, that the rhetor can return to later when speaking. I do see a difference between Aristotle and Quintilian here in that the latter focuses on the spontaneous nature of what comes out of the store of commonplaces (though Q doesn’t say commonplaces in that way) whereas for Aristotle there does not seem to be a spontaneous quality to his topics. Sure, over time and with practice Aristotle’s topics can become spontaneous, but they do not seem to be as organic or rather he does not seem to describe them as organic as Quintilian does. Anyway, in what he writes, Quintilian does seem to be saying that imitation can be a source of knowledge; however, 18 short pages later, he then comes to say that imitation is not enough, which leads me to the no side of the equation.
On the no side, Quintilian writes, “imitation is not sufficient of itself” (132). He later gives a fuller description of why imitation is not sufficient when he writes that the complete orator is one who adds her/his own excellences to what is imitated and even trims off what is unnecessary in the models s/he imitates (137). So, from this, Quintilian is suggesting that while imitation is the place to begin for a rhetor, in the end, the rhetor must exceed those imitative sources, and Quintilian even claims that students should aim to excel those who they follow or imitate, i.e. “for he who follows another must of necessity always be behind him” (133). It appears from these words that Quintilian is offering a hybrid use or purpose of imitation as a source of knowledge. Maybe knowledge is not the right word to use here because he usually discusses imitation in terms of style; however, Quintilian does claim that a student must understand “what he proposes to imitate” (135) so there is a knowledge component to it. Ultimately though, anyway you look at imitation, whether from a style or knowledge viewpoint, it is clear that Quintilian values imitation as a source of something from which a student rhetor can draw from to improve her/his own rhetorical abilities. So, imitation arguably is generative for the rhetor, and thus perhaps could be considered as epistemic.