Assignment for Wednesday, December 10

Mon, 12/08/2008 - 12:18 — Professor Rose

For Wednesday, 12/10: Classification Schemes for Pedagogical Approaches to Composition: 1979-2005

Re-read the following articles:

 

Fulkerson, Richard. “Four Philosophies of Composition.”  College Composition and Communication 30.4 (Dec. 1979): pp. 343-348.

 

Berlin, James A.  “Contemporary Composition: The Major Pedagogical Theories.”  College English 44.8 (Dec 1982): 765-777.

 

Berlin, James.  “Rhetoric and Ideology in the Writing Class.” College English 50.5 (Sept 1988): 477-494.

 

Fulkerson, Richard. “Composition Theory in the Eighties: Axiological Consensus and Paradigmatic Diversity.” College Composition and communication 41.4 (December 1990): 409-429.

 

Fulkerson, Richard. Composition at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century.” College Composition and Communication 56.4 (June 2005): 654-689.

 

“Interchanges” (Responses to Richard Fulkerson, “Composition at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century.”). CCC 57.4 (June 2006: 730-762.

 

 

Choose one of the following discussion questions and prepare a response.  Please post your response as a comment on this blog post by Tuesday evening at 11:59:

 

Obviously Berlin’s and Fulkerson’s later works have more events and ideas to account for, but what other differences do you see between early attempts to develop classification schemes and later attempts?

 

Using the Berlin and Fulkerson classification schemes as a starting place, how might you re-order the English 591 readings? Why?

 

 

 

Final: A copy of the Final Exam will be in your department mailboxes by 9:00 Friday morning, December 12. Your completed exam is due noon Friday, December 19 for print only. E-mail versions are acceptable through 5:00 p.m. Thursday, December 14, to allow time for glitches, lost files, etc. You will receive a confirmation of receipt.

 

Your Final Project is due Friday, December 12. A paper copy must be submitted by class time on Friday. In addition, you may submit an electronic copy if you prefer electronic comments, but I must receive a paper copy as well.

Comments

Tue, 12/09/2008 - 15:03 — ahidalgo

Grading, Survival and Ideology

In his "Philosophies" essay Fulkerson is particulary worried about scholars having the ability to teach and grade consistently.  Meaning not to teach one way and grade based on different criteria.

Fulkerson is much more content with the state of things in "Composition Theories."  He argues that though we haven't agreed on how to teach it, we at least have an agreement on what good writing is.  He calls it axiology and seems very hopeful that in the future we'll come to agree on the kind of pedagogy that will lead us to that axiology.

His hopefulness was waned by the time we reach "Summary and Critique."  He is very distressed here that we've lost our focus on the right axiology because of the arrival of new approaches like CCS, Genre and Community Discourse, which to him don't place enough emphasis on the writing process.  This essay stands out for its dramatism.  He feels like if we can't agree on this, we shall disappear as a field. This seems like a much bigger worry than his original concern about teaching and grading.  From reading him, it would look as if we're in a much worse place than we were in 1979.

In "Contemporary Composition" Berlin provides four categories, three of which are responses to the Aristotelian Rhetoric, which is basically current-traditional.  He counters that they are ultimately misreading Aristotle and allying with him based on that error.  He's very concerned, as elsewhere in his work, with the fact that as we teach writing we're also teaching a version of reality, which is a huge responsibility for us. 

In Berlin's Rhetoric and Ideology, he seems more concerned with ideology and language.  He argues that rhetoric is ideological by default because it uses language and language is ideological by nature.  This is linked to his previous idea that as we teach, we're teaching a version of reality, but it's interesting because if our ideology is so linked to language, it may be a more unconscious process that we may not be able to control, let alone teach, as well as we'd like to.  Of course just making students aware that ideology is there to begin with would be a very significant first step.

 

Tue, 12/09/2008 - 19:20 — Liz

Axiology


While thinking about how to re-organize the course schedule based the Berlin and Fulkerson classification systems, I realized that a lot would be lost if their systems served as the foundation for the course's organization. I'll begin with Fulkerson's "Four Philosophies of Composition." I could base the readings for grammar, revision, and editing off of the formalist philosophy and place this as the first set of readings (keeping with the order that Fulkerson suggests in "Philosophies"). Then, I could move the writing as process and expressivist readings after that, skipping over delivery. Next, I could use the mimetic philosophy to turn to cognitive and socio-cognitive theories of writing, and finally, I could include the readings on delivery, audience, and argument for the rhetorical philosophy.

This re-ordering leaves out writing as epistemic, which Berlin's scheme would account for, but then we encounter a problem: where do we put Flower and Hayes? Berlin places them into his beloved new rhetoric/epistemic rhetoric in "Contemporary Composition," but moves them to cognitive rhetoric in "Rhetoric and Ideology." I placed Flower and Hayes into Fulkerson's mimetic philosophy, which I would argue matches up with Berlin's cognitive rhetoric. So then is it best to use Berlin's "Rhetoric and Ideology" scheme for the re-organization because it matches up best with Fulkerson's? But what do I, then, with the sections on literacy, second language writing, feminist theory, and digital writing?

To (potentially) resolve this issue, I turn to Fulkerson's "Composition at the Turn of the Century" where he discusses an analytical scheme using axiology, process, pedagogy, and epistemology. If process is the basis of the re-organization, the readings could be organized based off their methodology, but then this course could become a course on composition methodology within composition theory. If pedagogy is the basis--that is organizing the readings based on their discussion of pedagogy, their approaches to pedagogy, etc., readings would be lost. For example, the two readings on second language writing do not discuss pedagogy, and losing these readings would mean silencing a large section of composition theory. Or, the readings could be organized by epistemology, but this could arguably turn into just another way to approach the methodology of each reading. Finally, the readings could be organized by axiology or by what they value. I would argue that the readings already seem to be organized by this approach, as each section has a theme that seems to reflect what the group of readings/authors value, e.g., literacy, epistemic rhetoric, gender, postmodernism, etc.

Overall, I'm not sure the readings should be re-organized by the schemes Berlin and Fulkerson suggest unless Fulkerson's axiology scheme is used. If another scheme is used, readings and theories potentially could be removed. If I learned anything from creating a lesson plan as my final project, I learned that removing readings is a difficult (and sometimes painful) process.

Tue, 12/09/2008 - 20:15 — clemenje

Disagreeing on Ends, Means, and Ends Again

Early Fulkerson: “Four Philosophies….” Fulkerson wants to give a coherent view of what goes on in Composition classes (344). He also wants to answer the “back to basics cry” and “the propriety of dialectical variations in student writing (347). He sees inconsistent value theory, ill-shaped pedagogy and modal confusion in evaluation as a big problem that a classification system can help to solve. His four philosophies grow out of Literature (a parallel set to Abrams’s four theories, 343).

Early Berlin: “Contemporary Composition…” Berlin thinks all approaches in the Composition classroom (like Fulkerson’s four) concern writer, reality, reader and language. Berlin sees Fulkerson and others suggesting that each approach only differs in which term is emphasized, but Berlin says the true difference is in _definition_ (765). Because we are teaching a way of making sense of the world and are making effective persons by making effective writers (776-7), Berlin thinks all Composition teachers need to be able to recognize and to justify which process they choose to teach and why (777). Most teachers still aren’t aware of the significance of their pedagogical strategies, he argues (766).

In “Rhetoric and Ideology…,” Berlin adds that Composition teachers need to be cognizant of and upfront about their ideological beliefs, in particular, and that all of the available approaches are ideological, even if they don’t readily recognize it (493). Ignoring the ideology inherent in argument is “to fail our responsibilities as teachers and as citizens (493). We need to realize that “a way of teaching is never innocent” (492).

Later Fulkerson: “Composition Theory in the Eighties…” suggests that we need a metatheory of Composition, something that accounts for means and ends, and not just “four philosophies” that account for ends. Fulkerson argues that we can, and, at that time, finally do agree on an end, the rhetorical axiology (14), and that even though we fight about the means to that end (process and pedagogy, 424), we shouldn’t (417), because it is possible to share an axiology and to not share a pedagogy or an epistemology (420); the four categories that constitute means and ends in this metatheory are independent (420). The goal that we all now want CAN be achieved through a diversity of methods (410).

Fulkerson suggests in the very beginning (“Four Philosophies”) we didn’t agree on ends. In “Composition Theory in the Eighties…,” we agreed on the end but not the means. In “Composition at the Turn…,” Fulkerson says we’re back to disagreeing on ends. The three new approaches (social turn, expressivism and rhetorical) are all problematic in their own ways. He suggests that if we want to be taken seriously as a “program,” however, we need to agree on something again sometime soon (680), even though he predicts “new theory wars” (681).

The responses to later Fulkerson mostly suggest that there is coherency within the field in the larger forces that have shaped us (downsizing of universities, effects of textbooks, integration of technology, etc.) (746), and that Fulkerson’s picture is generally too harsh and too bleak. The responses suggest that we can _integrate_ rather than “select” axiologies to become united.

Tue, 12/09/2008 - 20:29 — Caitlan

From Person-centered to Movement-centered Classifications

They way that Fulkerson and Berlin define their categories changes over time, and I think this is telling. Although ever article associates certain scholars with each category, over time it seems that the categorizations have shifted their point of view. In the beginning, the strategy seems to be “look at the theorists, and then describe the views they each hold” and by the end, the strategy is closer to privileging movements and then using some scholars’ work as examples of that movement.

This might seem like an unnecessary distinction to make. However, it seems to me that it might be possible (yes, I’m doing a lot of hedging here) that the sense of agency changes completely depending on how you describe your categories: if you describe your classification scheme in terms of groups of people—the Expressivists, the Positivists—it’s a lot easier to point to who’s responsible for it. An approach to composition becomes an identity. If, on the other hand, you describe your classification scheme in terms of movements—critical cultural studies, Expressivism—the movement has agency: it’s CCS that’s doing something, not a group of individuals. Giving a movement agency makes it seem a lot more inevitable, rather than a category defined by a writer. It brings into existence a thing which may or may not actually exist.

Of course, I realize that these observations aren’t uniform: Fulkerson does use the term “expressivist” in his 2005 article, and Berlin also refers to his categories in noun-indicating-thing terms in addition to noun-indicating-person terms (is there a proper term for a person versus a thing noun, incidentally?).

Still, I think that it’s true that between 1979 and 2005, the classifications move from person centered classifications to idea or movement centered classifications. At the beginning, it seems like classifications couldn’t exist separately from the people who held those beliefs, but by the end, it seems like the categories given have lives of their own, and could hypothetically exist without people to hold those beliefs.

Tue, 12/09/2008 - 21:19 — Laurie

Shifts in Difference/Consensus and Emphasis on Students


*Difference and Consensus

Both Fulkerson (1979) and Berlin (1982) describe Composition in terms of four differing groups. The groups, for the most part seem disparate; in their later articles, however, Berlin (1988) and Fulkerson (1990) argue from a position of consensus. They are argue from the position that this consensus represents a sort of progress in the field. *I do realize that this distinction may seem like one only of the content of their articles, but I am considering this preference for consensus as one that also contributes to their exigency and tone.

*Focus on Students or Not

Both Fulkerson (1979) and Berlin (1982) make their claims from the issue of unknowing teachers who unknowingly affect their students. Fulkerson terms this lack in consciousness as mindless teaching – as a situation in which “there was once more a mindless failure to relate the outcome valued to the means adopted” (348). Berlin frames the unsatisfactory teaching in a similar way: “The dismay students display about writing is, I am convinced, at least occasionally the result of teachers unconsciously offering contradictory advice about composing” (766). By 1988 and 1990, Berlin and Fulkerson, respectively, still make their arguments with teaching in mind, but their emphasis seems subtly different. The problem is no longer a lack of consciousness, and the student does not seem to occupy the same central position as the recipient of these poor teaching practices. Rather the arguments seem to emphasize the possible pedagogical discontinuities in way that places them against/within(?) theoretical concerns. I am not asserting that the student doesn’t figure into their discussion, but rather that the discussion are, indeed, focused somewhat different. Berlin (1988) opens by stating, “Ideology is here foregrounded and problematized in a way that situates rhetoric with ideology, rather than ideology within rhetoric” (477). The discussion is introduced through these concepts not through the teaching of students. Likewise, Fulkerson omits the students from his opening as well. As he summarizes previous article, he mentions the teachers and even a classroom, the “students” are not there/named. The focus is his new metatheory. The students return in Fulkerson’s 2005 article where they are, in fact, a population that is described and cited. For example, we see a discussion of first-year students in a way that is not evident in previous articles.

*I also see a difference in the way that Fulkerson is using textbooks from the earliest article to the latest, but I am not sure that I can articulate the difference very well. It seems that the earliest article uses the text books as examples for these various philosophies that exist, whereas the latest article uses the textbooks (for teachers of writing, this time) as artifacts from which the philosophies may be derived. The relationship may not, in fact, be so different, but the way that he frames it seems to be.

Tue, 12/09/2008 - 22:16 — Cristina Gonzalez

Revisting concerns

After re-examining Berlin’s and Fulkerson’s articles, I would argue that Fulkerson’s shifts seem more dramatic than Berlin’s, but I would by no means simply describe the changes as dramatic. In “Four Philosophies of Composition,” Fulkerson outlines the expressive, mimetic, rhetorical, and formalist philosophies of composition. What he could not account for in 1979 was the influence of social-construction approaches and the re-emergence of expressive approaches that he would critique in “Composition at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century.” In “Composing Theory in the Eighties,” he seems focused on clearly articulating the need for instructors to be aware of their philosophical approach and the application of such an approach. His revisiting of an analytical scheme in "Composition at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century"  (in table form) suggests dissatisfaction with the application of new and re-emerging approaches.

I am finding Berlin's changes more elusive. As does Fulkerson, Berlin identifies four composition philosophies, but these do not entirely match with Fulkerson's categories, despite Berlin's obvious interest in working from Fulkerson's categories. His later article, "Rhetoric and Ideology in the Composition Classroom," indicates a concern with outcroppings of approaches that are rooted in the same approaches he criticizes in "Contemporary Composition."

Personal aside: In my first reading of “Composition at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century,” I didn’t notice the playfulness in the second subsection title, “Mapping Comp-landia.” I’m certain that I’ve never heard the “landia” suffix outside of the Southwest, where I frequently heard it used in a social-construction context. I had to giggle when I noticed the intentional inclusion of Texas-style CCS lingo in an article that is critical of that approach’s goals.

Wed, 12/10/2008 - 00:41 — min

Berlin

Personally I like Berlin’s work taking historical and rhetorical perspectives on the writing class being conscious of “all formulations are historically specific, arising out of the material conditions of a particular time and place” (p. 478, ’88). With his theoretical approaches, I can question who defines norms such as Standard English and why being different in race, class, and gender cannot be considered just different, not abnormal or wrong. So I just want to reorganize our readings into two camps in terms of their relation to how they deal with the issue of ideology: Berlin vs. Non-Berlin camps. The Berlin camp includes social epistemic and other social rhetorics conscious of ideological implication imbedded in the writing class and sharing similar pedagogical approaches such as teaching differences and empowering students: Kenneth Burke, Richard Young, Alton Becker, Kenneth Pike, Kenneth Bruffee, Janice Lauer, Lester Faigley, David Bartholomae, Samantha Blackmon, Patricia Bizzell, and others. Those who take traditional approaches or not overtly dealing with the issue of ideology belong to the Non-Berlin camp: James Moffett, James Britton, Linda Flower, Johan Hayes, Peter Elbow, Donald Murray, etc. There should be differences between each other even in the same camp. So comparing and contrasting each approach, we can better understand their rationales, pedagogical approaches, theoretical frameworks, etc. For example, the writing process can be a common factor even between theories from different camps. And there should be a place of multimodal writing in discussing reading from those camps.

Wed, 12/10/2008 - 00:38 — Brian

Berlin and Fulkerson's earlier and later works

Other than the larger number of kinds of composition instruction in the later articles, I see more of a trend of similarity between earlier and later articles of Berlin and Fulkerson respectively. It seems to me that Berlin in both articles is concerned primarily with how the writing instruction “argues for a version of reality”. Although he creates different categories in the later articles, he still seems to be concerned even in his new categorization with how the approach deals with truth: truth that can be objectively found in the world, truth found in the individual, or truth created through discourse. It is interesting though that in the 1988 article he didn’t feel the need to put current-traditional or classical argumentative rhetoric in his table.

Fulkerson seems to me to be consistently concerned with how writing is evaluated, and his purpose is to clarify approaches so that there is a direct connection between the approach used and how the students’ papers are graded. In contrast to Berlin, he places more emphasis on pedagogical differences. Fulkerson changes the number of categories as a result of a decline or proliferation in the use of approaches, but he uses similar “axiologies”. In 1979 he uses expressivist, mimetic, rhetorical, and formalist. In 1990 he removes all but rhetorical based on what he sees as a decline in use of the others. In 2005 he brings back two (procedural rhetoric seems similar to mimetic), and adds the social construction view. But his focus even with the new category is on pedagogy and evaluation, and he notes that the evaluation standards of the social construction view are ambiguous.

Wed, 12/10/2008 - 05:32 — Zack

Fulkerson & Berlin

Differences between early attempts to develop classification schemes and later between Berlin’s and Fulkerson’s works include a couple of things. One, there seems to be a strictness that Fulkerson discusses within his texts that existed in regards to developing classification schemes. He is more interested in writing about the mistakes that students make and focuses on the repercussions that will occur when these mistakes occur. His lack of leniency runs counter to that of Berlin’s in that he focuses primarily more on the future and the possibility of change, regardless of the mistakes that students make within their writing. Berlin makes a conscious effort to stand tough with his pedagogical purity and leniency that occurs upon a student’s mistake.

Wed, 12/10/2008 - 10:10 — esproat

Institutional Rhetorical Shifts

The main difference I see between early attempts to develop classification schemes and later attempts is the rhetorical shift instigated by changing institutional realities. In the early 1980s, Composition scholars found themselves in a field still in need of scholarly justification. You see traveling theory used in almost apologetic ways (as in religious apologetics - not expressions of regret) - this is especially true in Fulkerson's early work. Twenty years later, Composition scholars find themselves in a field that no longer feels an institutional need to justify its existence in relation to other disciplines. The concerns for the field manifest in terms of expansion and not justification. By expansion, I mean that in the early 2000s, Composition scholars are more concerned with where Compositions (lack of) borders are than with the value of pursuing scholarly work in Composition.